

Good for What, Good for Whom?: Decolonizing Music Education Philosophies

Deborah Bradley

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Edited by Wayne Bowman and Ana Lucía Frega

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Abstract and Keywords

This article examines philosophy's role in epistemological colonialism in music education. Western philosophy as a system of reasoning was one of the factors justifying European colonialism; the discursive traces of these supporting Enlightenment philosophies remain in today's educational thinking. Following World War II, the last groups of people living under colonial domination fought for and eventually won political independence, yet the complex relationships that developed under the colonial system remain in social structures and discourses. The article concludes with an effort to imagine philosophy as a tool for questioning and challenging the epistemological colonialism that too often lingers within music education's philosophical discourses.

Keywords: European colonialism, colonial domination, Western philosophy, colonial music, epistemological colonialism

Who writes? For whom is the writing being done? In what circumstances?

These, it seems to me, are the questions whose answers provide us with the ingredients making for a politics of interpretation.

–Edward Said

This chapter interrogates philosophy's role in what I characterize as epistemological colonialism in music education. Western philosophy as a system of reasoning was one of the factors justifying European colonialism; the discursive traces of these supporting Enlightenment philosophies remain in today's educational thinking. Following World War II, the last groups of people living under colonial domination fought for and eventually won political independence,¹ yet the historically, (p. 410) geographically, and psychologically complex relationships that developed under the colonial system remain in social structures and discourses, including the stated and unstated goals of formal education, and in market forces, communication methods, and information networks as sites of informal education (Dei and Kempf, 2006, 7). In North America, the resulting damage to students mar-

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ginalized by this vestigial, epistemological colonialism may be seen in the overrepresentation of students of color among those identified as requiring special education, in higher school dropout rates among black and Latino students, and in the economic stratification of societies along racial lines. In formal education, colonial residue continues to define how knowledge is produced and what forms of knowledge are considered legitimate. Indigenous forms of knowledge and knowledge production, including the diverse musical practices of most of the world's people, have long been dismissed, even denigrated, as a result of lingering colonial attitudes. The recent trend toward greater inclusion of "world music" in education often takes colonialist form through unauthorized appropriation and publication, through multiple forms of misrepresentation, and through language suggesting such music, as indigenous knowledge, is marginal or inferior to the Western musical canon.

The historical relations of colonialism and its effects, including its psychological imprints, are rife with contradictions (Asher, 2009). The colonizers brought with them not only formal education but also new forms of work and production that continue to emerge under globalization, with differentially distributed benefits and consequences. There is an immediate need to understand the complex ways in which people were brought within this system, because its impact is still being felt (Smith, 1999, 23). For example, India's rapid economic growth has made it an emerging global power but has also deepened stark inequalities in its society (Yardley, 2009). While the landscape of opportunity has widened in choice, "the colonial shadow falls across the successes of globalization" (Bhabha, 2004, xii). Although the colonial system produced complex, symbiotic relationships between colonizers and colonized from which both sides benefited, the benefits remain greatly unequal. The negative effects manifest as inferred feelings of inferiority or deficiency, and in measurably inequitable outcomes.

My goal for this chapter is to illustrate some ways in which philosophy (as a Western discipline) and philosophies of music education, influenced by colonialist thinking, reproduce epistemological colonialism. Decolonizing texts typically reflect "both histories of colonization/oppression *and* efforts of resistance, that engage both our similarities *and* our differences across race, class, gender, culture, region, and nation" (Asher, 2009, 4). As Asher writes, decolonizing projects must negotiate the challenges of implied binary constructions: colonizer/colonized, colonizing/decolonizing, the "West and the rest," and so forth. Such binaries obscure the ways the postcolonial world operates: through continuing entangled, hybrid, and symbiotic relationships. This chapter focuses on colonialism's negative influences on thinking in music education, but the issues are complex, often contradictory, and difficult to parse.

(p. 411) Although it has the potential to decolonize and liberate (to release us from limited ways of thinking), philosophy has more often played a role supportive of epistemological colonialism—by advancing or imposing Eurocentric ideologies of knowledge production (Dei and Kempf, 2006, 2). This chapter seeks to decolonize some of the dominant philosophies of music education by promoting critical insight into the underlying assumptions, motivations, and values that inform epistemological practices, and by interrogating "the

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age old dilemmas about authenticity, originality, indigeneity and autonomy of cultural, scientific, literary values and aesthetic creations” (11). While performance-based disciplines like music education have unique capacities to “contribute to radical social change, to economic justice, to a utopian cultural politics” (Denzin, Lincoln, and Smith, 2008, xi), music education philosophy often hinders these possibilities by presenting answers in ways that foreclose dialogue rather than exploring questions. Viewed as a set of answers rather than as a process of continually emerging questions, philosophy may lead to dogmatic adherence to pedagogical beliefs and methodological approaches. Philosophy colonizes when it intimidates those who might otherwise engage in critical thinking. Where philosophy is conceptualized and presented as a product, it is often assumed that only some people can think philosophically: that the majority requires philosophy to be done for them.

Throughout the chapter I speak of *decolonizing philosophy*, a phrase that can be taken at least two ways. It may suggest a system of reasoning devoted to reversing colonialist influences in society and education; or it may imply the act of exposing and addressing the problematic aspirations of traditional philosophical practice—to do other people’s thinking for them, to provide answers rather than provoke thinking, and to dispense universal truths. This potential for dual meaning is part of the term’s appeal. Philosophy is both noun and verb, an action in which everyone concerned with music education—academics, community musicians, students and teachers in classrooms and community settings at all levels—can and should engage, and to the benefit of all. Conceived of as a verb, as process rather than product, philosophy has the capacity to revitalize and decolonize both thought and practice in music education.

I begin by examining the hegemony of Western concepts of philosophy. I then focus on the presentation of philosophies as products for consumption, as fixed sets of ideas transmitted to practitioners in ways that direct, even dictate, pedagogical action. I argue that philosophy should be conceptualized not as a product for use by music educators, but as the “sustained, systematic, and critical examination of belief” (Alperson, 1991, 217). I take Alperson’s statement as a reasonable starting point for music education philosophy in today’s diverse world, since it allows for self-interrogation and reflection, key elements in decolonizing efforts. Reflexivity and critical examination of belief are essential if philosophy is to escape its colonialist roots—and allegations of colonialism have been directed both at philosophy (Ikuenobe, 1997) and sociological research methods (Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva, 2008). To avoid the trap of epistemological colonialism, philosophies should continually interrogate the assumptions upon which they are built. Philosophy so (p. 412) conceived benefits not only those who engage in critical examination of belief but ultimately music education’s most important stakeholders: music students at all levels. Philosophy as a way of thinking and being in the world ought not to claim the academic ivory tower as its sole domain.

In what follows I address what is commonly known as aesthetic education, since this particular philosophy of education continues to operate as the sensible given (Lyotard, 1988) in many sites of music education worldwide. However, other philosophical approaches, in-

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cluding praxial music education, critical pedagogy, and multiculturalism may also evince epistemological colonialism and must also be interrogated. The chapter concludes with an effort to imagine philosophy as a tool for questioning and challenging the epistemological colonialism that too often lingers within music education's philosophical discourses.

What Does It Mean to be Educated?

The term *education* has developed commonsense meanings that vary historically and regionally (Said, 1994, 1978). To construe education as a universal notion thus reinforces colonizing tendencies this chapter seeks to address, since both the question and its answer(s) are culturally situated.

While, for many, education and schooling have become nearly synonymous terms, the concept of education I put forth does not necessarily depend upon credentials gained through formal schooling. Some of life's most important lessons are learned not in schools but through the process of living. Dewey (2004) describes a primary goal of education as "the recreation of beliefs, ideals, hopes, happiness, misery, and practices" (2) that serve to renew the social group. As he explains, schools are an important method for transmission of what members of a society need to know, but in fact are a "relatively superficial means" (4) compared with other agencies. Because the perpetuation of social life itself is dependent upon teaching and learning, the process of living together, with other people, educates (6). Thus education's significance, as human association, "lies in the contribution which it makes to the improvement of the quality of experience" (9). Anti-colonial scholars argue that education is for the entire community: parents, children, guardians, caregivers, young, and old. This view of education encompasses the options, strategies, processes, and structures through which individuals and groups come to know and understand the world and how they act within it (Dei et al., 2000, 7).

The foregoing blurs the distinction between formal and informal education. Acknowledging the importance of knowledge acquired through cultural immersion(s) creates a space for what are sometimes referred to as *indigenous knowledges* (Dei, Hall, and Rosenberg, 2000), which, under colonialist systems of education, are viewed as incongruent with formal education. Dei and colleagues (p. 413) assert, "all knowledges exist in relation to specific times and places. Consequently, indigenous knowledges speak to questions about location, politics, identity, and culture, and about the history of peoples and their lands" (4).

When indigenous beliefs conflicted with Western knowledge, colonial education attempted to eradicate those beliefs in a misguided attempt to forge common understandings. Such education functions imperialistically, allowing little room for anything but official, institutionally sanctioned knowledge. For example, Kincheloe and Steinberg (2008) describe Andean knowledge as an epistemological and ontological dynamic—a way of knowing that is relational, a spiritual process. Andean beliefs hold that rivers, mountains, land, soil, lakes, rocks, and animals are sentient, raising the question, At what point are oxygen, water, and food separate from human organisms? Grande (2008) suggests that in-

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indigenous epistemologies are characteristically comfortable “with a lack of certainty about the social world and the world of nature” (151).

What Does It Mean to Be *Musically* Educated?

Like education, the concept of musical education is culturally situated. In North America, for example, the notion of a musically educated individual typically describes a person who has studied formally for years to learn to play an instrument or to sing. In Ghanaian Ewe culture, learning to become a master drummer involves both childhood enculturation (informal education) and years of practice with a master drummer (formal study). Many Ghanaians learn a wealth of traditional music and dances entirely through enculturation and community participation. Similarly, Native American flute players, singers, and drummers tend to be immersed in their cultural practices from an early age through community events and ceremonies, eventually feeling called to be a flute player, singer, or drummer. Although these individuals devote significant time and effort to the development of their musicianship, the concept of musical education as something acquired through schooling does not apply.

In North America, a more narrow understanding of music education has grown up around school-based choirs, bands, and orchestras. In such circumstances this idea of music education is more or less synonymous with large ensemble experience, and Western classical music is privileged as the knowledge worth having. Indeed, it is the only recognized form of musical knowledge considered valid for entry into many North American university music schools. Residual colonial attitudes thus determine the cultural capital required for entry to university music programs, through a process Koza (2008) calls “listening for Whiteness.” Within this system, aural musical traditions, popular music, and even the venerated classical traditions of, for instance, India or China have little currency.

While the repertoire of K–12 school music programs has become more diverse in recent decades, prevailing Eurocentric values and assumptions often result in the imposition of Western analytical concepts onto musical practices better understood (p. 414) from indigenous perspectives. Like the Andean concept of *sentience* described previously, Feld’s work with the Kaluli people in Papua, New Guinea, points to the inseparability of music makers and their “musicking” (Small, 1998) from their environment (Feld, 1994). From the perspective of traditional Western philosophical practice, however, Kaluli music and epistemology may appear naïve, even primitive. And on a practical level, emphasis on traditional large performing groups makes such broad concepts of musicking an awkward fit for most music education programs. This limits students’ opportunities to discover their unique relationships with music (Kelly, 2009, 64).

Discovering one’s unique relationship with music can develop in many ways outside formal education. I think of the countless numbers of competent, self-taught guitarists, percussionists, singers, and so forth, for whom music is an important part of who they are. There are millions of discerning listeners who are deeply knowledgeable about diverse musical practices—classical, jazz, popular, Javanese gamelan, Chinese opera, Indian car-

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natic music—whose understandings go far beyond what they may have been taught and learned in formal instructional settings, and far beyond the educational outcome called “music appreciation.” Individuals often knowingly use music as a resource to regulate feeling, thinking, and acting in their daily lives—as a resource for construction of identity (DeNora, 2000, p. 62). Developing students’ unique relationships with music ought to be a fundamental goal of musical education. Unfortunately, this goal is frequently neglected, even ignored in favor of developing performing groups that by their nature exclude those students whose musical interests lie elsewhere.

Encouraging students to develop their unique relationships with music takes as a starting point what Ladson-Billings (1995) calls *culturally relevant pedagogy*, or the inclusion of “student culture in the classroom as authorized or official knowledge” (483). Others have echoed Ladson-Billings’ call for cultural relevance in their arguments for the inclusion of indigenous knowledges (Dei, Hall, and Rosenberg, 2000; Dei et al., 2000; Dei and Kempf, 2006; Le Grange, 2004), here taken to be “students’ own music.” Yet popular and world beat musics bring into play the messy terrain of capitalism and cultural imperialism, influencing students’ identities in ways that are not necessarily desirable. In order for students to avoid the colonizing thought and practice of these discourses, music education philosophy must help students and their teachers understand the power structures they involve.

If the role of education, whether formal or informal, is to prepare people to function as productive members of society (Dewey, 2004), to be effective it must be “life-long, community-based, and oriented to the real-life experiences of the students” (Day, 1998, 51). Day’s statement implies that education is obliged not only to transmit officially sanctioned forms of knowledge but also to work with the knowledge students bring to the classroom from their lives outside school. This is crucial if pedagogy is to be culturally relevant, and if students are to make meaningful, important, and durable connections between and among school knowledge, family life, community relationships, cultural practices, and personal interests.

(p. 415) Within music education, Regelski (1981, 1994, 2002b, 2002c, 2004) has written extensively and critically about the discipline’s failure to nurture lifelong engagement with music, a failure attributable to narrow curricular foci, unconnected to students’ musical lives outside of school. The restrictive framework of “school music” not only fails to connect with many students but it implies through omission that music existing outside of school is unworthy of study and therefore inferior. Similarly, the skills and understandings essential to enjoyment of musics excluded from the curriculum are undervalued, their practitioners’ musicianship deemed of lesser quality. Where music education fails to help students make musical connections to their lives outside school, many infer that they are simply “not musical,” or that their areas of musical interest lack value. This psychological imprint of musical inferiority mirrors the internalized sense of inferiority that results when indigenous cultures are denigrated in colonialist systems of education. The message of musical inferiority goes hand in glove with emphasis on developing “talent” through performing ensembles and the attendant need to “weed out the untalented” in

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the pursuit of “musical excellence.” These practices often scar students’ psyches, requiring in effect that they “submit to the process of colonization, and participate in the realization of the colonial relationship” (Asher, 2009, 3). For those excluded from school performance groups, for those who struggle to find relevance in school music curricula, and for those unable to hear “their” music in school, music education operates as a colonizing discourse. The systems of reasoning supporting these exclusionary practices function as “epistemological tyranny” (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 2008, 145), far too often resulting in students’ internalization of messages, both implicit and overt, of musical inferiority.

The Role of Philosophy in Music Education

Alperson’s description of philosophy as a “sustained, systematic, and critical examination of belief” suggests an ongoing reflexivity about what one thinks and what one does as a result of the reflection. In teacher education, significant efforts are often devoted to helping students become “reflective practitioners.” Helping preservice teachers develop reflective practice implies learning to think philosophically, to understand how beliefs influence musical decision making, choices, and actions.

Students usually begin their journey toward becoming music educators without any background in philosophical inquiry. Some think philosophy is beyond their ability to understand; others believe it is merely “ivory-tower conjecture on the far side of an unbridgeable gulf from classroom practice” (Elliott, 1995, 9). Both of these perspectives point to epistemological colonialism within music teacher education. Developing the ability to examine critically one’s own beliefs and actions directly influences the nature of the encounters and relationships that emerge within teaching-learning contexts, and, ultimately, determines one’s ability to enact culturally relevant, decolonizing music education practice.

(p. 416) Philosophy as a Colonizing System of Reasoning

Smith (1999, 65) argues that academic knowledges, particularly the traditional disciplines including philosophy, are grounded in cultural worldviews antagonistic to other belief systems. While Smith acknowledges that some disciplines are more extensively implicated in colonialism than others, she reminds us that during colonial expansion, theories generated from the exploration and exploitation of colonies developed a philosophical structure that appropriated the other as a form of knowledge: “The construction of knowledges which all operate through forms of expropriation and incorporation of the other mimics at a conceptual level the geographical and economic absorption of the non-European world by the West” (65–66). In other words, the theories that emerged during colonial expansion took as a given Europe’s right to appropriate and/or expropriate land and resources, absorbing these as European possessions, and to speak for “the other” through universalist perspectives. Music education reproduces this epistemological tyrann-

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ny through the absorption of indigenous musical forms and the imposition of Western musical concepts onto other musicking practices.

Ikuenobe's (1997) examination of the differences between "philosophy" and "African philosophy" illustrates concern about the incorporation of the "other," while showing the difficulties inherent in the idea of philosophy as the systematic, critical examination of belief. He writes that efforts to articulate an "African philosophy" often construe philosophical discourse as taking one of two forms: "universal" or parochial ("folk"). From a universalist perspective, African philosophies are deemed "folk philosophies" and are therefore parochial, regardless of how well considered, logical, or consistent they may be within their particular contexts. Implicit in this analytical system are beliefs that equate valid philosophy with Western rational thinking; such thought presumes to speak for all other forms of reasoning by appropriation and incorporation.

Ikuenobe's argument concludes provocatively: "To deny a people a philosophy is to deny them any kind of intellectual activity, a system of thought, culture, and civilization" (196). In accepting the philosophy/folk dichotomy, it appears he may have inadvertently bought into the attendant notion that nonessentialist and nonuniversal forms of philosophy are not truly philosophical. But the point I wish to emphasize emerges from his argument that both universalist and parochial philosophies are "culture-relevant in various, subtle ways" (201). He asserts, in effect, that if folk philosophies are parochial, the same must hold for universalist philosophies grounded in Western systems of reasoning; these, too, are framed by their own culturally bound, and to that extent parochial, worldviews.

Both Ikuenobe and Smith suggest that Western concepts of rational thought have had deleterious effects on knowledge production for all people. Ikuenobe suggests that to function as a truly universal, metadiscipline, philosophy would need to be capable of synthesizing "features of the thoughts" and ideas of people from all (p. 417) over the world, and from different historical periods and epochs. Thus, philosophy should be seen "first as an activity, and second as a system of beliefs, ideas, ways of seeing and thoughts that have been structured by culture, different experiences, time, and history" (203-4).

Ikuenobe's proposal seeks to reframe commonly held notions of what philosophy is, what it is good for, and who might benefit from "doing" it. At the same time, however, Ikuenobe's proposal risks reproducing what Agawu (2003) calls the tendencies of dialogic representation: unless it results in concrete political action, Agawu argues, the dialogic impulse validates "what is essentially a monologue by incorporating an image of 'native discourse' into the monologuer's theory and on his or her own terms. . . . It actually substitutes a particularly virulent form of political violence for 'mere' epistemic violence" (69).

The preceding quotation points to a tension that is evident as I write this chapter. My inclusion of the perspectives of postcolonial and anti-colonial scholars seeks to bring into the discussion voices uncommon in music education discourse. However, given my position of privilege in the North American academy, this strategy may simply incorporate "native discourse" into a monologue that reproduces colonialist power. As the sole author

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of this piece, I decide what is quoted, who is quoted, and how those quotes are utilized. This points to a difficulty in writing decolonizing texts and reiterates the necessity for those of us so engaged to interrogate our own implication in and responsibility “for resisting and transforming oppressive structures and practices” (Asher 2009, 6).

Music Education Philosophies as Colonizing

Probing the ideologies of practice makes us aware of the darker side of knowledge ordering.

Agawu 2003

A decolonizing text from the field of ethnomusicology provides an entry point for exploring some of the ways philosophy may have colonized the thinking of music educators. In *Representing African Music*, Agawu (2003) interrogates the categorizations and descriptions of African musical characteristics found in ethnomusicology that contribute to the othering of Africans and their music. Agawu argues against analyzing African musics from the perspective of “difference,” challenging scholars to “remain vigilant in ensuring that no perceived hierarchy is facilely interpreted as corresponding to a fixed reality” (22). A similar challenge exists for music education philosophies when perceived hierarchies operate as fixed realities through restrictive accounts of “good music,” framed, for instance, in questions like, What music is appropriate to teach? What constitutes good repertoire? Whose musical cultures should be represented?

(p. 418) In the chapter “African Music as Text,” Agawu’s argument resonates with Ikuenobe’s concern about folk philosophies. He pleads for ethnomusicologists to dispense with the “facile distribution of insights” in categories designated variously as Western or African because they uphold a divisive approach to music understanding (115). Such acts of categorization create monolithic concepts of African musics that ignore the musical diversity of the continent. While acknowledging the import of Western ethnomusicological contributions to knowledge about African musics, Agawu makes it clear that Africans have yet to benefit from the knowledge so produced: “Their aim is not to empower African scholars and musicians but to reinforce certain metropolitan privileges” (196). Within music education, the benefits of philosophical inquiry tend to rebound to the academy, even when the intention is to empower music teachers and students.

Aesthetic Music Education and Epistemological Colonialism

Aesthetic education, a system of reasoning that remains influential within the discipline of music education, draws extensively upon the philosophy of aesthetics whose roots extend to Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* (1790). Like all philosophers, Kant was influenced by his social and political surroundings. His writings sought to flesh out how it is that we know what we know, in part to subvert the Church as the sole source of moral authority. By positioning aesthetic judgment as a common sense and beauty as a “symbol of the morally good” (Zuidervaart, 2004, 55), Kant held up European art works as exemplars of

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the good and moral in the world—simultaneously devaluing the artistic expressions of (among others) the world’s indigenous people. This argument served (however inadvertently) the colonial agenda by implying that indigenous expressions could not be considered “art,” thus rendering its producers less than fully human. This bias eventually found its way into music education philosophy to the detriment of most forms of popular and folk music, which, to the extent they were incapable of sustaining the sophisticated kind of experience regarded as purely or genuinely aesthetic, were considered inferior forms of musical expression.

Aesthetic philosophy as a system of reasoning emerged in music education as *aesthetic education*. One particular text, *A Philosophy of Music Education* (Reimer, 1970, 1989, 2003), gained widespread acceptance as an authoritative guide to “music education as aesthetic education.” Written to provide answers rather than raise questions about the nature and value of music and music education, *A Philosophy*, however unwittingly, served as a colonizing influence on the thought and actions of many music educators.

As postmodern philosophies and related concerns for pluralities flourished in the social sciences and education, the 1989 edition of *A Philosophy of Music Education* became the object of vigorous critique (Bowman, 1991; Elliott, 1991, 1995; Koza, 1994) to which the first edition had not been subjected. I will address the 2003 edition shortly but would like first to revisit a few key criticisms raised about the 1989 edition by way of background for a discussion of the residual colonizing effects of this philosophy decades after its initial publication.

(p. 419) In 1991, the *Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning* published critical reviews (Bowman, 1991; Elliott, 1991) of the 1989 version of *A Philosophy of Music Education*. Both critiques focused on logical flaws in the arguments about music education as aesthetic education. Details of those arguments warrant exploration and consideration that exceed the scope of this chapter, but above the various arguments advanced, a common note sounds: the philosophy of aesthetic education reads as the only valid way to view music and music education—a “truth” to be accepted rather than a starting point for discussion or reflection. Bowman (1991, 82) suggests that the arguments are constructed so as to require “acquiescence” from students or those unfamiliar with (Western) philosophy and its style of logical argument. Similarly, Elliott (1991, 51) states that *A Philosophy* could “give music educators the false impression that there are no philosophical alternatives to the aesthetic view.” Another way of expressing these concerns might be to say that the book’s arguments appeared designed to proselytize (a tactic reminiscent of Christian missionaries under historical colonialism)—proffering aesthetic education as the only legitimate way to think about music and music education.

In her review, Koza (1994) writes, “when we buy into traditional philosophical discourse, we get its shortcomings in the bargain” (89), including the search for universal truths and essentialisms. Her critique of *A Philosophy* provides a detailed analysis of the ways the text serves, in her view, to perpetuate the oppression of women and marginalized groups through “evasion of history, politics, and context” (75). Koza describes the text as a tradi-

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tional philosophical argument exhibiting a “relentless search for universal, essential ingredients in people, art, and education” (76), and relying extensively on “inside/outside dichotomies to which good/bad valuations often have been assigned” (79). Falling on the “bad side” of the virgule is most popular music, evincing a latent elitism that insists only some music has educational value (83).

Rather out of sync with other educational discourses of the time in their explorations of multiculturalism, the 1989 version of *A Philosophy* made only fleeting reference to “the music of various cultures” and in language often based on a spices-in-the-stew analogy that exoticizes and marginalizes: “the joy of sharing the world’s multitudinous flavors” (Reimer, 1989, 145). Moreover, its overarching argument called for a centering of Euro-American music in the curriculum: “But at the other extreme the program can get so ethnically focused as to forget that the United States is part of a larger culture—the culture of Western music” (145). As Kincheloe and Steinberg (2008, 135) suggest, assertions like these imply, however subtly, that multiculturalism is “a threat to Euro/Americanism.”

Perhaps as a result of the concerns raised by Bowman, Elliott, Jorgensen (1997), Koza, and others, a revision of *A Philosophy* was published in 2003—with the subtitle, *Advancing the Vision*.² There is evidence that this edition attempts to address criticisms of the 1989 version and to introduce contemporary changes in aesthetic (p. 420) theory. However, the arguments in *Advancing the Vision* remain grounded in binary constructions designed to dismiss perspectives that trouble the conceptual waters of aesthetic education. For example, in a section acknowledging tensions between aesthetic theory and postmodernism, a discussion of the “postmodern mind-set” (16) implicitly denies postmodernism’s status as philosophy. Indeed, the term *mind-set* appears to imply that postmodern thought is rigid, resistant to new perspectives or arguments, and thus unsuited to music education philosophy. Arguments favoring pluralistic approaches are countered with rhetorical questions: “Should music education abandon its emphasis on the classical music of the Western tradition? Are all musics equally good just because each music has its own characteristics? If all music is equally valuable, how do we choose what is most worth teaching?” (20). As in the 1989 version, the questions suggest that multiculturalism represents a threat to music education.

The proposed alternative to postmodern thinking—a “synergistic” approach—seeks to “resolve” issues framed (ironically) as binaries: for example, contextualism/universalism. These “synergistic resolutions” prescribe actions designed to unify the thinking of music educators everywhere. The strategy of coercing perspectival pluralities into synergistic resolution seems to foreclose debate, negating the possibility that genuine differences of perspective may coexist. This, too, is a strategy of traditional philosophical approaches that frequently discourages others, particularly students, from engaging in further discussion.

Advancing the Vision functions as a philosophical product (a text) whose proposed process (synergistic resolution) may inadvertently colonize those who seek advice from

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its pages. While Reimer's intentions are undoubtedly altruistic, his discursive strategies implicitly deny music educators active, creative roles in the development of their own philosophical ideas about the nature and value of music or music education. Although synergistic resolution ("this-with-that" arguments) acknowledges the complex nature of issues in music education, it extends to music educators few if any alternative choices and actually reduces the binary to a single option. Static resolution rather than critical reflection appears its ideal.

Read as a source of answers, the unintended effect of *Advancing the Vision* may be to foreclose inquiry rather than to encourage and nurture it. By presenting philosophy as a (finished) product—a closed book if you will—elitist attitudes are encouraged, attitudes reminiscent of modernist aesthetic philosophy, attitudes that were part and parcel of colonial conquests and occupations. Such attitudes and arguments, even reframed for today's world, continue to colonize unless teachers and students engage them critically and reflectively, determining for themselves whether and how philosophical inquiry informs musical and educational problems.

Praxial Music Education: Performance, Pedagogy, and Power

As interests in multicultural education gained momentum in the late 1980s, disenchantment with the discourse of aesthetic education also began to emerge publicly. Drawing from sociology and other disciplines, some music educators (p. 421) began exploring "praxial" philosophies of music education. Although they approached the concept of praxis with individual nuances, they shared concerns that philosophies of music and music education be grounded in musical action rather than aesthetic reception. Alperson, for instance, urged that we "understand [music] in terms of the variety of meaning and values evidenced in actual practice in particular cultures" (Alperson, 1991, 233), while Bowman sought to make apparent "the crucial facts of music's social situatedness and practical nature" (Bowman, 2002a, 28; also see Bowman, 1994a, 1994b). Regelski (1981, 1986, 2004) wrote of "action learning" to reinforce the concept that music is best learned by doing within particular contexts, not through analysis of abstract concepts or passive "music appreciation."

An examination of the philosophical work of these authors reveals significant variations in interpretations of praxial music education. My remarks here focus predominantly on *Music Matters* (Elliott, 1995), whose subtitle, *A New Philosophy of Music Education*, suggests an alternative to aesthetic music education philosophy. *Music Matters* argues strenuously against many of the assumptions of aesthetic music education, and in that sense it represents an effort to decolonize music education philosophy by deposing a long dominant ideology. Even so, traces of epistemological colonialism are evident in its pages. It, too, proffers philosophy as product rather than process.

Music Matters argues that music is not merely a collection of works to be studied, analyzed, or "appreciated." It is, rather, a mode of action that can only be understood by active involvement in making and listening to music. Describing music as a diverse human

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practice and a shared human endeavor, the text acknowledges the various ways that humans engage in music as social phenomenon. Drawing on the understanding that all humans are musical, Elliott argues that all children deserve opportunities to come to know music by making music, a viewpoint that differs significantly from the aesthetic rationale.

“Who writes? For whom is the writing being done? In what circumstances? These, it seems to me, are the questions whose answers provide us with the ingredients making for a politics of interpretation” (Said, 1998, 155). Said’s questions are important to consider with respect to *Music Matters*, which, in addition to arguing against aesthetic education, also sought to push back against the de-skilling (Apple, 1995) of teachers that had occurred since the 1970s.³ As Elliott argued, the de-skilling of music teachers resulted in part from the uncritical acceptance of aesthetic education and associated “teacher-proof” texts that, in Elliott’s view, encouraged students to be passive consumers of music rather than active participants (Elliott, 1995, 32). However, in the attempt to return decision-making responsibility to music teachers, *Music Matters* may have placed too much power in their hands—power that undermined its promise for decolonizing teacher-student relationships.

(p. 422) *Music Matters* calls for each music education site to be a reflective musical practicum, arguing that music education, even in school settings, should be more like musical practices outside the classroom. The argument for reflective musical practica draws upon the model of apprenticeship, which assumes that the teacher knows most if not all of what students need to learn. Indeed, the expertise required by teachers to conduct such reflective musical practica is among the book’s recurring themes. This focus on teacher expertise neglects student knowledge, implying (if through omission) that students lack the potential to contribute to collective knowledge production. Combined with what has been criticized as a bias toward performance (Lamb, 1994; Reimer, 1995) and characterized as a masculinist presentation (Lamb, 1994), the role of teacher within this philosophical orientation resembles that of a conductor who controls decision making within an ensemble.

Considering the importance granted to large ensembles in North America and elsewhere,⁴ this should not surprise. Although Elliott makes a strong case for other forms of music-making in education—including listening, composing, and improvising—*Music Matters* may have provided advocates of large ensembles with a renewed sense of purpose at a time when many were beginning to question their relevance. Thus, while Elliott’s version of praxial philosophy for music education potentially decolonizes (some) teachers by resisting de-skilling, for those teachers comfortable being regarded as experts in their respective educational settings, the book provides little incentive to share power with students, who remain colonized within traditional authoritarian musical ensembles or classrooms.

This particular approach to praxial music education may be potentially decolonizing in that it values the diversity of human musical practices and resists the de-skilling of teachers. However, *Music Matters’* style of argument also suggests an epistemological colonial-

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ism: it reproduces the discursive patterns of the aesthetic education texts against which it argues. The approach does little to discourage continued authoritarian, colonialist approaches to teaching; neither does it encourage teachers and students to question its underlying premises and philosophical assumptions.

It deserves mention that in *Music Matters*, Elliott discusses the role of reflection at length. These discussions, however, tend to focus on reflection in the moment of teaching. Missing is the ethical element of praxis for which both Regelski (2002c, 1994) and Bowman (2002b, 2002a) have argued, the concern for phronesis, or “right action.” “Phronesis enables one to discern what is significant and how to act rightly in diverse and fluid situations, fields of action for whose demands one can never be fully prepared” (Bowman, 2002b, 70–71). Phronesis potentially steers action and reflection toward ethical concerns about students—the development of their unique relationships with music and their construction of identities. It features centrally in the practical knowledge music educators seek to develop in students alongside musicianship. Phronesis suggests the type of reflective practice through which (p. 423) decolonizing approaches to both music teaching and music education philosophy may emerge. Without this important perspective, however, praxial approaches fall short of their full potential to decolonize music educators’ thinking and action.

Can Critical Theory and Pedagogy “Save” Music Education Philosophy?

Decolonizing texts often draw upon critical theory for guidance. In education, the related concept “critical pedagogy” often provides an approach to decolonizing educational theories and practices. Although these are the theoretical perspectives with which I usually associate, it is important to acknowledge that critical perspectives, like aesthetic and praxial music education philosophies, may also involve problematic assumptions.

Critical theory typically perceives society as dysfunctional and problematic. Critical theorists engage in ideology critique by which false consciousness can be analyzed and valid knowledge rationally debated, justified, and communicated (Regelski, 2002a, 4). Such critiques typically reject economic determinism, directing attention to concerns like “media, culture, language, power, desire, critical enlightenment and critical emancipation” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, 160). Educators’ concerns about the effects of false consciousness on marginalized peoples have led them to develop critical pedagogies. The work of Paulo Freire (1970, 1994; Freire 1998) has been especially influential here, emerging from his efforts to improve literacy among peasants in Brazil. A significant feature of Freire’s work is his concern that education bring to consciousness the conditions that create and perpetuate oppression. “Conscientization” enables individuals to understand the nature of oppression and actively seeks to provide the skills to improve life conditions. Within education, there are many variants or strains of critical pedagogy, including critical multiculturalism, anti-racism education, feminist pedagogies, and oth-

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ers, each devoted to the development of more effective forms of resistance to processes of oppression.

Critical theory and pedagogy have found their way into music education discourses rather belatedly, largely through the work of the MayDay Group (see Regelski and Gates, 2009). However, these perspectives do appear to be gaining greater acceptance among music educators, many of whom struggle with aesthetic education's notions of music as an autonomous entity disconnected from sociopolitical concerns, or with the neglect within performance-driven music education of students' engagement in their own learning. Critical pedagogues view learners as active agents in their learning, and seek to redress the differential power relationships between teachers and learners so widely reproduced by traditional instructional practices.

As music educators incorporate critical perspectives into their teaching, the need for awareness of critical pedagogy's potential to colonize becomes "critical." Critical pedagogy can easily lapse into a condescending stance whose response to patterns of domination paradoxically replicates those patterns. Ellsworth (1989) (p. 424) argues that the key assumptions, goals, and pedagogical practices in the literature of critical pedagogy—*empowerment, student voice, dialogue*, and even the term *critical*— "are repressive myths that perpetuate relations of domination" (298). She and others argue that critical pedagogy's concepts of *empowerment* and *liberation* uphold the power and privilege of those seeking to empower and liberate, reproducing colonialist relationships between critical pedagogues and their students.

While the deep desire to help others often motivates those who teach, there are important differences between helping and rescuing. Dei argues against salvific motivations: "Teachers who regard themselves as on a mission to 'save' the underclass or disadvantaged only serve to reproduce the perception of inherent privilege accorded to those from the dominant culture who must 'tend to the less fortunate'" (Dei et al., 2000, 246). He argues instead for *emancipatory pedagogy* as an approach that divests power and acknowledges students' contributions to knowledge production.

Other concepts within critical pedagogy warrant interrogation as well. Recently, the discourse has incorporated terms from the fields of cultural studies and postcolonialism: *fluidity, hybridity, mobility*, and *transgression*, ideas that have begun to make their way into critical approaches of music education. At first gloss they appear to counter the implied binaries of colonization/decolonization or colonialism/anti-colonialism, adding complexity that tends to elude dichotomous constructions. Such notions may be especially attractive for philosophers in music education, since they seem to resonate with ways new musical forms emerge from cross-cultural contact. However, like the language of empowerment, many indigenous people and anti-colonial scholars see the purportedly "liberatory" constructs of fluidity, mobility, and transgression as part of the fundamental lexicon of Western imperialism (Grande, 2008, 240). As Grande writes, such concepts often ignore the historic, economic, and material conditions of difference and divert attention away from

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issues of differential power (242). For example, where is the line separating hybridity from appropriation in world beat musics?⁵

The foregoing criticisms point to some of the difficulties that may attend the use of critical theory and pedagogy as decolonizing perspectives for music education philosophy. The language of critical theory, despite good intentions of theorists and pedagogues, may paradoxically reproduce the epistemological colonialism it seeks to disrupt, while its practitioners inadvertently assume roles as colonizers.

The Politics of Inclusion: Multicultural Music Education's Potential to Colonize

The fall of colonialism ushered in an era of heightened global migration. People of the former European colonies, who had been taught through their colonial education that they were subjects of the “motherland” (Hesse, 2000), emigrated to those (p. 425) European “homes” in search of better jobs and living conditions, and improved education for their children. One response to the changing demographics of schools, both in North America and globally, has been multicultural education. Multicultural education involves diverse paradigms ranging from liberal democratic to critical perspectives. While well intended, most if not all such approaches have served to maintain cultural separation instead of creating the kind of inclusion that lets students keep “their cultural differences intact” (Szecsy, 2010, 2).

While multicultural education continues to wrestle with unintended consequences of many of its practices, such concerns have reached music education belatedly and slowly. While many music educators have urged the inclusion of cultural context when teaching music (Koza, 2001; Bradley, 2006b, 2009b, 2008, 2009a; Morton, 1994; Campbell, 1994, 1996, 2002, 1995, 2004), too many of multicultural music education's resources and practices simply continue to follow aesthetic education's lead, utilizing “common elements” approaches to instruction. By providing scant sociocultural contextualization, these approaches inadvertently portray music as stand-alone works, as pieces to be learned for their own sake. Such approaches can be profoundly reductive, resulting in the treatment of music as repertoire. This often leads in turn to musical exoticism that leaves the European canon centered in the curriculum (Morton, 1994; Koza, 2001; Bradley, 2006a, 2006b, 2008; Bradley, Golner, and Hanson, 2007; Campbell, 1994). Unfortunately, exoticism does little to promote cross-cultural understanding—the goal Campbell (1994, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2004) sees as primary, both in multicultural and world music education.

Making resources available to music educators worldwide is a great service to the discipline, but too many of them serve to reproduce colonial issues of representation, appropriation, and commodification. Campbell's *Global Music Series* (Oxford) provides greater cultural contextualization of regional musics and cultural groups, perhaps indicating her personal dissatisfaction with the reductive approaches of many earlier publications. However, many of these early publications remain staple resources for K-12 multicultural mu-

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sical curricula, continuing to trivialize and tokenize cultures, and reproducing colonial attitudes through inadequate or distorted representations.

Since the first Tanglewood symposium in 1967, many music education scholars have urged greater inclusion and musical diversity in music curricula. However, the continued emphasis on the European canon (and the continued application of its values to music of other cultures) suggests lingering colonial attitudes. Music outside the canon has been appropriated and subsumed within existing curricula, leaving Western cultural hegemony intact. Agawu (2003) writes, “It is easy to be enamored of diversity—indeed to promote and celebrate it—if you are not required to yield a square inch of intellectual or cognitive territory” (223).

Kazmi (1997) cautions, similarly, that while multicultural education has the potential to subvert dominant discourses, this rarely happens. As he explains, the refusal to recognize multiculturalism’s subversive possibilities prevents its emergence as an alternative to the dominant culture and acknowledgment of its (p. 426) legitimacy (331). He argues further that “alien cultures . . . are allocated a space and a role in ‘the truth’ of the dominant culture . . . their meaning controlled by the commentaries on them” (340). This criticism resonates deeply with current circumstances in multicultural music education: European and North American music educators have generated the vast majority of the discipline’s scholarship, to the exclusion of those who might speak more knowledgeably about their music and culture.

Smith observes that colonialism “opened up new materials for exploitation” and that, “at a cultural level, ideas, images, and experiences about the Other helped to shape and reinforce notions of essential differences between the western world and the rest” (Smith, 1999, 60). Interest in presumed “essential” differences grew as indigenous Asian, American, Pacific, and African forms of knowledge assumed the status of “new discoveries” by Western scientists and scholars. Some scholars are therefore quite concerned about the ways indigenous knowledge has been appropriated and incorporated into multicultural curricula, where it is treated variously as “a threat to Euro/Americentrism⁶ and-or as a commodity to be exploited” (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 2008, 135).

May (2009) claims that multicultural education “has been plagued by a naïve preoccupation with culture at the expense of broader material and structural concerns” (34)—the differential material benefits, for example, that result when musical materials are appropriated for publication. This preoccupation with culture is particularly evident in efforts to locate new and ever more “exotic” music for the curriculum. Under such circumstances, multicultural music education becomes, in effect, its own “aesthetic”: pursued for its own sake rather than as a means for promoting cross-cultural understanding. In order for multicultural music education to fulfill its decolonizing potential, such concerns must remain central both to philosophy and pedagogy.

Within discourses supporting globalization, material and structural concerns sometimes become secondary to the “postcolonial celebration of hybridity,” a discursive orientation from which concerns about the politics of representation and cultural exchange are too

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often absent (Grande, 2008, 239). Such discourses invoke music's natural hybridity to justify their neglect of the power issues implicated in the appropriation of indigenous musics for choral publications (Bradley, 2006a, 2009a) and instrumental arrangements of world musics (Abramo, 2007). Rather than facilely embracing musical hybridity, a decolonizing approach recognizes that "globalization theory . . . hides the fact that its ethics are those of the marketplace and not the universal ethics of the human person" (Freire, 1998, 114). A decolonizing education, therefore, enables students "to see that there is no pure west and east, and that curricula, texts, and identities, including their own, are shaped by history, geography, and economics" (Asher, 2009, 11). Decolonizing music education requires that (p. 427) multicultural philosophies and pedagogies explore musical hybridity not simply as the natural outcome of contact between cultures, but as phenomena generating questions such as, Who presents the music for study and how? Who receives credit for doing so? Whose voices are marginalized or erased in the process?

The processes outlined here—exoticism through token inclusion; superficial celebration of diversity; fear of diversity combined with its exploitation as commodity; and the celebration of hybridity—all speak to the potential for multiculturalism to fall prey to epistemological colonialism supporting a Eurocentric musical norm. This leads some scholars to conclude that "the current multicultural paradigm is mired in liberal ideology that offers no radical changes" (Ladson-Billings and Tate, 2009, 178). Multicultural music education is not a mode of practice or curricular orientation to be pursued for its own sake, without regard for its consequences. It has deep roots in philosophical assumptions about the nature and value of music, and about the aims and objectives of education. To neglect these foundational philosophical concerns is to compromise the decolonizing potential of multicultural music education.

Where Do We Go from Here? Decolonizing Music Education Philosophy

The picture painted in this chapter may appear bleak. It has criticized aesthetic education philosophy for its colonialist orientation, and has questioned certain renditions of praxial music education, critical pedagogy, and multicultural education as potential forms of epistemological colonialism; thus, the temptation may be to abandon philosophical inquiry altogether. This is not possible, however, since actions are inseparable from beliefs and values. To embrace untheorized practice is to embrace philosophical nihilism—an irresponsible perspective with damage far more severe than any we have surveyed here. The question is not whether to engage in philosophy, but how to make explicit the many subtle relationships among philosophical assumptions, pedagogical practice, and social justice. Music educators have largely tended to accept philosophies articulated by prominent scholars without much critical interrogation. Philosophy texts have become de facto rules for what and how to think about music and pedagogy: substitutes for rather than incentives to thought. While music education philosophers do not necessarily intend that their arguments foreclose debate, when these are constructed as definitive answers rather

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than resources for further inquiry, vital processes of thought are transformed into mere commodities.

It is difficult to avoid this dilemma. Indeed, the philosophers and philosophies I discuss here (what some may regard as my North American centrism) might be (p. 428) seen as evidence of my own epistemic colonization. I offer this not to apologize but to highlight the complexity of issues related to philosophy as colonizing. Were I to attempt a decolonization of philosophies popular outside North America and beyond my own experiences, I would reiterate the academic colonial relationship by imposing the god's-eye view. However, it is imperative that we find ways to help music educators think more critically about their own ideologies and philosophical positions: the processes by which they create and evaluate their pedagogical practices. Music education holds the potential to be transformative, to create the conditions for social change that Dewey, DuBois, Denzin and Lincoln, Freire and so many others have articulated. But to achieve such ends, music teachers must engage with, rather than blindly accept, the philosophies of others, facilitating counter narratives in an ongoing process of philosophical exploration (Stonebanks, 2008, 313). In this perspective, counter narratives (or personal "philosophies") are not merely textual accounts of beliefs or ideas. Counter narratives emerge at the level of practice, in the actions of those who engage in philosophical thinking about their practices and reflect on those actions both in the moment and afterward. The goal of counter narrative is to improve practice both individually and throughout the discipline.

What might decolonizing counter narratives for music education entail? They begin, I believe, with *phronesis*, an ethical orientation with questions at its core, one that construes philosophy as a process that directly informs action, and action as a process that directly informs theory. *Phronesis*—the ethical concern to engage in right action rather than action that is simply correct or expedient—is mindful of the wide range of influences instructional actions may produce, and thus insists on an ongoing reflexivity regarding those actions. Teachers and students are not just capable of this kind of action and reflection; they are pursuits in which all responsible teachers and learners ought to engage. Philosophy as reflective practice is not simply "ivory tower conjecture" (Elliott, 1995, 9).

Music educators and students at all levels need to engage in reflective processes that problematize potentially colonizing actions, to discern what constitutes "right action" in a given teaching and learning situation. Music education colonizes when it promotes unequal power relations in the classroom; when it operates from presumptions that students are "empty vessels" to be filled; when it proceeds as if only some students are deserving or truly capable of learning music; or when it implies, however inadvertently, that only some musical genres have educative value.

A decolonizing perspective for music education philosophy considers power relations and focuses concern for the ways music education is implicated in students' identity construction. For example, *phronesis* requires ethical deliberation in the use of indigenous knowledges in education. While Kincheloe and Steinberg (2008) acknowledge the potential for these knowledges to be catalysts for political, epistemological, and ontological change,

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when brought into the curriculum for their own sakes rather than as ways to build cultural connections, appropriation and misrepresentation often follow. In music education, moving beyond “add-and-stir” approaches to multiculturalism to robust inclusion of multiple musical genres that decenter (without eliminating) the Western canon, calls for a (p. 429) reconstituted, more broadly conceived vision of what it means to be musically educated.

Decolonizing philosophy will not result in greater unity of practice, nor should it. It should lead us to a stronger belief in the necessity for philosophical reflection on what we do as music educators—a move away from philosophy as “epistemological tyranny” (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 2008, 145) and toward an epistemology that accepts its own fallibility: epistemology, that is comfortable with uncertainty. Such philosophy is an ongoing, reflexive critique of beliefs, motives, and the outcomes of practice. Decolonizing philosophies of music education should take into account questions of cultural identity and music’s role in the construction of the self. As Freire (1998) writes, education should make possible conditions in which learners interact with one another and their teachers in a process of understanding themselves as “social, historical, thinking, communicating, transformative, creative persons” (45).

In place of the epistemological tyranny implicit in some philosophical approaches, Freire argues for an “epistemological curiosity” that leads teachers and students alike to question, know, act, ask again, and recognize that “open, curious questioning . . . is what grounds them mutually” (81). As teachers, we recognize epistemological curiosity as heightening our concerns for students: What do they learn, and how? How do their musical doings over time help them produce themselves as coherent beings? Such epistemological curiosity decolonizes through recognition of the importance of musical experiences “in the street, in the square, in the work place, in the classroom, in the playground” (Freire, 1998, 47), all of which contribute substantially to development of the self.

Decolonizing philosophy requires that we ask regularly, What aspects of the status quo do our philosophical assumptions and actions in music education replicate? How instead might those processes help students understand who they are in the world in ways that break down barriers of race, gender, and class, and resist heterosexism and ableism? How might we acknowledge, value, build upon, and challenge the varied knowledges students bring with them? A decolonizing philosophy of music education demands “permanent, critical vigilance in regard to the students” (Freire, 1998, 63)—not just to “the music”—to ensure the creation of just and inclusive educational practices. Philosophy so conceived will not only decolonize the practice of philosophy in music education but also the practices of music education.

Reframing what it means to educate musically requires that we approach all music, and all philosophies of music education, with an understanding of their contextually situated nature. Such understanding raises epistemological questions about the production and consumption of music as a form of knowledge. In reflecting on these questions, our goal

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should be to understand music's importance to identity construction—individual; collective; gender; racial; cultural; national; and indeed, in the case of music education philosophy, even academic identity—and the myriad other ways people understand themselves. Such reflection will help us remain conscious of the subtle connections between culture, philosophy, and what is considered successful music education.

(p. 430) A decolonizing philosophy avoids presenting itself as a source of answers, or a substitute for others' philosophical engagements. Rather, it displays an ongoing and relentless curiosity about all forms of knowledge production, including those within music education, and including its own.

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Notes:

(1) Edward Said argued that political colonialism is ongoing, since the Palestinian people remain colonized under Israeli rule.

(2) This subtitle appears to imply that the aesthetic rationale for music education is both adequate and worthy of further advancement.

(3) This, too, may be viewed as a decolonizing approach, or as resistance to perceived colonialism in education.

(4) The trend toward large orchestral ensembles in China, Korea, and other areas in Asia suggests that this form of music education continues to gain popularity.

(5) For an in-depth discussion of these issues and their complexity, see Feld, 2000.

(6) See the previous discussion on aesthetic music education, particularly Reimer, 1989, 145; 2003, 20.

Deborah Bradley

Deborah Bradley teaches in the Faculty of Music and Emmanuel College at the University of Toronto, and has also taught in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her research focuses on anti-racism, anti-colonialism, and social justice in music education. Dr. Bradley's work is published in the *Philosophy of Music Education Review*; *Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education*; *Music Education Research*; and *Diverse Methodologies in Music Education*.